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Price Bubbles of New-Technology IPOs

Haim Kedar-Levy++
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev*

Asset pricing models with atomistic agents typically relax assumptions concerning
rationality and/or homogenous information in order to track endogenous bubbles. In this
model, identically informed rational agents hold a Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) for a
single new technology asset at IPO, yet they differ with respect to risk aversion. By
mapping risk preferences to strategies, we use marginal supply and demand functions to
solve for the PLM if REE holds. By relaxing the assumption of complete knowledge of
agent's tastes and wealth, post-IPO bubbles emerge where the Actual Law of Motion is an
amplification (bubble) of the price processes vs. the PLM.
Introduction
Homogeneous information, uniform tastes and agents' rationality are cornerstone
assumptions for capital asset pricing, but prior art conclude that under these conditions,
non-atomistic agents have no incentive to trade and the expected equilibrium price will
be stable. These results do not correspond to observation of capital asset markets, as trade
is evident and bubbles are revealed as they occasionally burst. Over the past decades,
major stock-market bubbles were associated with significant impact of new technologies
on the real economy (1929, 2000) or new trade mechanisms like portfolio insurance and
program trading (1987). The question we address here is whether unobservability of
preferences and wealth might result in bubbles, especially following new-technology
IPO.
Divergence of real and financial assets from fundamental valuation has been
documented since the early 80's (Shiller (1981), Grossman and Shiller (1981), Summers
(1986)). Academics, mostly, define financial bubbles as deviations from fundamentals
++
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that persist for periods that are too long to be explained by response to external shocks.
The first researchers of the subject, Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946), attributed such
deviations to speculation which they consider rational. Both addressed speculation as a
byproduct of differences in risk aversion where more risk-averse agents "sell" some of
the risk to less risk-averse ones. The more risk-averse agents trade based on fundamental
values while their counterparts adopt speculative strategies. It turns out that Keynes and
Hicks see speculation as a tool to reallocate risk among trading agents. In this model, we
segregate agents by investment strategies based on different measures of risk aversion,
thus precisely fit their approach.
Equilibrium analysis of capital asset pricing with unobservable fundamentals
started with Feldman's Ph.D. dissertation (1983), and followed in articles by Dothan and
Feldman (1986), Detemple (1986, 1991), Gennotte (1986), Feldman (1989, 1992),
Detemple and Murthy (1994) and Coles, Loewenstein and Suay (1995). In general, the
goal in the above mentioned models is to explicitly solve for the unobservable moments
endogenously. They view the price process as a noisy realization of the unobservable
fundamental moments. In most cases, the realized price process is a function of the
conditional unobservable moments of the production factors, production function and
agents' first and second utility function derivatives. Another approach has been taken by
Kurz (1994a, 1994b, 1996 and 1997) who constructed the theory of Rational Beliefs.
According to Kurz, agents do not possess complete structural knowledge of the
environment and its changes, especially changes in technology, tastes and economic
institutions. Thus, there is a question whether such changes are random deviations around
a fixed mean value function of a stationary process, or whether they reflect changes in the
mean value function itself. Beliefs must satisfy Kurz's Rationality Principle, that call for
consistency of beliefs with the data. Essentially, beliefs are formed by assuming agents
act as econometricians who apply a learning model on realized returns and use the
coefficients to plan ahead.
Rational expectations models of bubbles are attractive as they adhere to core
economic theory. This is why these models were the first to appear in the late '70s - early
'80s (Blanchard (1979), Flood and Garber (1980), Blanchard and Watson (1982), Tirole
(1982)). Bubbles in these models evolve based on a self-fulfilling rational expectations
mechanism, which supports the bubble as long as it exists, and the price crashes when the
mechanism disappears. These models do not specify what endogenous conditions must be
satisfied for a bubble to evolve, knowing that a stable economy have operated with the
same agents and technology prior to the boom, and under what inherent terms will the
bubble blast. Starting from the mid '80s equilibrium models of bubbles typically involve
explicit or implicit assumptions of irrational behavior by a certain group of agents. Some
models assume noise trading (e.g., Kyle (1985), Black (1986), De-long, Shleifer,
Summers and Waldmann (1990), Binswanger (1999), and Levy, Levy and Solomon
(2000). Others assume overreaction to news (Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), De-Bondt
and Thaler (1987), Kent, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)) or signaling between
investors who have asymmetric information (Allen and Gale (1992), (2000a), (2000b),
Allen and Gorton (1993), Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993)). The economic meaning
of such assumptions is that either fundamental information is not available to all agents
(asymmetric information), and/or different agents process information in different ways
(the noise-trader approach). Binswanger (1999) extends De-Long et al.'s model by
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allowing dynamic changes of the fundamentals due to technological changes. On another
front, the emergence of derivative securities and thereby Portfolio Insurance (PI) is
claimed to contribute to the underlying assets volatility if markets are not complete
(Grossman (1988a), (1988b), Grossman and Zhou, (1996)).1 Research about PI boosted
after 1987 when academia and government-committees have studied their potential
contribution to the stock market crash (Brady, 1988, SEC, 1987).
In this paper we show that agents' inability to observe others' optimal trading
strategies, classified to Momentum and Contrarian, might result in amplified volatility
and return if the Momentum strategy dominates or a dimmed price process if the
Contrarian dominates. We thus specify explicitly positive (and negative) mispricing,
while observability yields the Merton (1971) rational expectations process. This model
uses the notion of incomplete information at and post-IPO to establish a model of
bubbles, thus should not be considered as a model of IPO.
Section I describes optimal dynamic investment rules for non-price-taking agent
groups, based on Merton (1971). In Section II we define the groups, derive their marginal
supply and demand functions for shares and solve the equilibrium price. In Section III we
relax the complete information assumption and derive ex-post moments vs. Rational
Expectations Equilibrium (REE), resulting in Momentum Dominance Equilibria (MDE)
or Contrarian Dominance Equilibria (CDE). In section IV we discuss bubbles and Section
V concludes.
I. The Economic Setting
Consider a reduced form of Merton (1971) economy in which we address the
portfolio selection problem with incomplete information2. The investment opportunity
set is comprised of two assets, a riskless bond yielding exogenous, fixed rate of return r
and a single risky asset. The latter represents a new-technology equity share for which
there is no return and variability track-record.3 All agents have the same information thus
1

In order to insure a portfolio, an investor may either hold the underlying risky-asset long and buy a put
option with a strike equal to the desired insurance level, or he may buy a call option with a risk-free asset.
In both cases, the negative tail of the distribution is sold (for a fair premium) to the issuer of the option. The
latter may bare the risk, and the underlying asset price will not be affected, or he may replicate a Portfolio
Insurance (PI) strategy in the underlying securities market to transfer his risk to other investors. By doing
so, such agent is executing a momentum (speculative) trading strategy vs. "the market" as long as he is
atomistic. However, if the investor affects market price, the latter will rise and eventually revert to the
fundamental. It turns out that by modeling momentum strategies in the underlying assets we capture the
spillover of the demand for portfolio insurance to the contrarian agents, who are essentially suppliers of PI.
2 Merton (1971) shows that the effect of a fixed planning horizon on the intertemporal portfolio-selection
problem comes through the riskless capitalization factor (1  e ) / r , applied on a constant displacement in
r ( t T )

the HARA-type utility function, termed . This function is strictly concave and monotonically declines in t.
For a long enough horizon T, this factor is marginally constant when T is far ahead and declines at faster
rates as t  T , reaching 0 at T. Particularly throughout the last phase, systematic effects on the stock weight
in the portfolio emerge. Since we want to present different portfolio effects, we shall ignore the time-effects
by assuming that T is far enough for all agents, an assumption that corresponds with IPO at t=0.
3 In the Merton (1971) model there is no "hedging demand" which implies a certain degree of myopia that
the present model inherits. Since the context here is for new-technology shares with idiosyncratic risk, this
short-coming may be of less importance. Alternatively, as noted in Ross (1975), one may consider the
above investors as institutions for which the myopia deficiency is less important than for an individual
investor.
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the return generating process of the stock is assumed by all to follow a discrete-time
Geometric Brownian Motion, being the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM). We assume
that agents do not know each other's wealth and utility function. We classify atomistic,
expected utility maximizing individual agents based on the direction of their marginal
trade, adopting the terms "Momentum" and "Contrarian" strategies, as will formally be
presented below.
New information about the real capital asset's value arrives periodically through a
normally distributed noise z t . Due to the unobservability of other agents' marginal trade,
we establish the equilibrium price through trade in a tatonnement clearing mechanism.
Since we endogenously solve for the return generating process, we (and not the agents)
can compare it with Merton's (1971) REE price process and specify positive or negative
bubbles, as if an equivalent economy existed. Finally, we assume that there are no
transaction costs, taxes, or other frictions.
A. Agents
Agents are classified by two generic strategies - Momentum (M), whereby an
increase in wealth call for increasing the amount invested in shares, and Contrarian (C),
according to which an increase in wealth result in reducing the amount invested in shares.
Strategies and their magnitude depend on the specific HARA-type utility function
parameters, as illustrated below.
The PLM is a Geometric Brownian Motion with constant ̂ and ˆ ,
dPˆ  P ( ˆt  ˆz t ) . Under complete information and Rational Expectations (RE)
t  t

t

t

the realized stock price moments must comply with the PLM. Let Sk ,t  N k ,t Pt , t be the
stock value held by individual agent k at t, where N k ,t is the number of shares and Pt
their price.

 N k ,t

 N is the number of shares issued at the IPO. Define bond value

k

held by the agent Dk ,t  Qk ,t Bt , t , where Q is quantity of bonds and B their price (bond
are available to all agents at unlimited supply), and let  k ,t  Sk ,t / Wk ,t and
1 -  k ,t  Dk ,t / Wk ,t . W is the wealth invested in stock and bond. All t  0 values
represent IPO allocation. Thus
Wˆ k ,t  t  N k ,t Pˆt  t  Qk ,t Bt  t

 S k ,t (1 

dPˆt  t
)  Dk ,t (1  rt )
Pt

 S k ,t (1  ˆt  ˆzt t )  Dk ,t (1  rt )



(1)



 Wk ,t 1   k ,t ( ˆt  ˆzt t )  (1   k ,t )rt
Such a wealth-conservation process4 is frequently presented as
Wˆ k ,t t  Wk ,t 1  ( r   k ,t ( ˆ  r ))t    k ,tWk ,tˆzt t .

4

Note that the last equality is equivalent to equation [10] in Merton's (1971) discrete time prolog to the
continuous time model.

(2)
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Samuelson (1969), Friend and Blume (1975) and Ross (1975) were the first to
analyze such wealth accumulation processes in discrete-time while the continuous-time
equivalent has been pioneered by Merton (1969, 1971 and 1973). Using a Taylor-series
expansion to estimate U (Wˆ k ,t t ) up to the second order, where U is a von-NeumannMorgenstern utility function, and applying the expectation operator, we get5
1
E U (Wˆ k ,t t )  U (Wk ,t )  U (Wk ,t )Wk ,t r   k ,t ( ˆ  r ) t  U (Wk ,t )Wk2,t k2,tˆ 2 t .
2
The first order condition of (3) with respect to K,t is,
dE (U )
 U (Wk ,t )Wk ,t ( ˆ  r )  U (Wk ,t )Wk2,t k ,tˆ 2  0 .
d k ,t





(3)

(4)

Solving for  k ,t we get

U (Wk ,t ) ˆ  r
,
U (Wk ,t )Wk ,t ˆ 2
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative

 k ,t  

(5)

and by using the
risk aversion,
U (Wk ,t )Wk ,t
RW ,k ,t  
, we obtain the familiar relationship, similar in form to the models
U (Wk ,t )
of the aforementioned authors,
1 ˆ  r
 k ,t 
.
RW ,k ,t ˆ 2
Let all individuals have a hyperbolic utility function in wealth of the following
HARA type

(6)



U (W , t )  e

 t


1  W
   .

 1


(7)

We use this utility function since agents with different attitudes toward risk apply
different dynamic strategies that are simple to obtain from (7) and are the building blocks
of this model. This function can produce relative or absolute measures of risk aversion
that both can be constant, decreasing or increasing in wealth. Table 1, in Appendix 1,
summarizes this function's properties. By fixing RW ,k ,t in (6) we obtain the optimal
investment rule for individual agent k,
ˆ
 k*,t  tWˆ k ,t  t  N k*,t t Pˆt  t 
N k ,t Pˆt  t  Qk ,t Bt  t  k  k ,

ˆ  r 6
where  k  1   k , ˆ 
.
ˆ 2
5

k





Note that neglecting changes higher than the second order when share prices follow log-normal
distribution does not affect total demand for shares (specifically the demand for "hedging", elaborated in
Merton (1973)).
6 This type of utility functions embodies a displacement factor   that, if negative, represents a demand
K K
for "safety net", or insurance level to the agents' wealth. It implies replication of a call option by Constant
Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) with a multiplier m   /  M  1 and a floor  M  M  0 .
Alternatively, agents who have a positive displacement factor essentially supply portfolio insurance to the
market, thus mimicking a put option. A related notion has been presented by Leland (1980), Grossman and
Vila (1989), Black and Perold (1992) Grossman and Zhou (1996) and others.

(8)
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II. Marginal Supply and Demand Functions for Shares
In models with atomistic investors, the stochastic price path is exogenous,
observable, and unaffected by the agent's trade; thus, the equilibrium path is the
stochastic process itself. However, in a partially observable economy we need an
additional degree of freedom to solve the system, and that is provided by the marginal
supply and demand functions for shares.
By definition, the number of shares held by agent k at t+Δt is equal to the number
of shares she held at t, plus an optimal, unknown at that stage, marginal trade over Δt,
N k ,t t  N k ,t t  N k ,t . Henceforth lowercase k, c, and m indicate individual variables
while capital letters indicate group-wise aggregate equivalents. Aggregation by group is
permissible since both risk parameters  and  are assumed identical group-wise. Note
that while individual agents are atomistic, group-aggregates determine the share price
endogenously. We omit the optimality symbol "*" in (8) from now until the end of this
section, when we derive equilibrium, for simplicity of notation.

N C ,t t

A. The Contrarian Strategy
Denote the aggregation of contrarian agents by subscript "C". By replacing
 N C ,t  N C ,t t in (8) and solving for N C ,t  t we obtain

N C ,t t 

 ˆ

ˆ
~



D




N
 1 ,
C ,t  t
C C
C ,t 
d
Pt  t C
 C


~
where DC ,t t  QC ,t Bt t and Pt d t represents the marginal demand function for
shares. Equation (9) can be rewritten as
ˆ ~
D
 C  C
 C C ,t  t
d
Pt  t 
,
ˆ 


  N C ,t  t
N C ,t 1 


C 

that will satisfy the properties of a demand function if it maintains a strictly
Pt d t
Pt d t
 0 and weakly-positive convexity
 0 .7 The
negative slope
( N C ,t  t )
( dN C2 ,t  t )
class of agents for whom the contrarian strategy is optimal is defined in Proposition 1:





Proposition 1:
Agents who adopt a Contrarian strategy must have taste parameters
~
N C ,t
DC ,t  t
 C  ̂
, and C  
which imply that they have DRRA and DARA attitude
N C ,t  t
C

7

(9)

In this case, strict positive convexity will hold due to the first requirement as presented in Appendix 2.

(10)
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~
 DC ,t  t  C  C  0
C  0





N C ,t  , and CRRA if
toward risk if 
N C ,t
 , DARA alone if 
ˆ
ˆ
 C   N

 C   N

C ,t  t 

C
,
t


t


C  0




ˆ N C ,t  .



 C
N C ,t  t 

Proof: See Appendix 2.
B. The Momentum Strategy
Let type M individual agents have a convex payoff schedule, being an investment
rule whereby an increase in wealth result in an increasing exposure to shares in their
portfolio, and vice versa. Following the procedure as detailed above, their marginal trade
is
 ˆ

ˆ
~
N M ,t t  s
DM ,t  t   M  M  N M ,t 
 1 ,
Pt t M
M

s
where Pt  t is the marginal supply function for shares, which may be phrased,
ˆ ~
D
 M  M
 M M ,t  t
s
Pt  t 
.
ˆ 


  N M ,t  t
N M ,t 1 


M 

A marginal supply function for shares must satisfy strictly positive slope
s
Pt  t
Pt s t
 0 and weakly positive convexity
 0 , although in our case strict
( N M ,t  t )
( N M2 ,t )
convexity will hold. The taste parameters that satisfy a Momentum investment strategy
comply with Proposition 2.









Proposition 2:
Individual agents who adopt a Momentum strategy must have a measure of risk
 M  0



N M ,t  , which complies with
aversion and displacement factor that satisfy 
ˆ
0   M   N

M ,t  t 

DRRA and DARA attitude toward risk. Such agents will not have CRRA or CARA
attitudes toward risk.
Proof: See Appendix 3.

(11)

(12)
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A graphical illustration of the marginal supply and demand functions derived
above for shares is presented in Figure 1.8 In the following section we establish
Walrasian equilibrium based on these marginal functions.
Figure 1
Marginal Supply and Demand Functions for Shares
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Figure 1 describes graphically the marginal supply and demand functions for shares by
agents M and C. An increase in price implies an increase in the number of shares by agent M
( N M ,t  0 ) and a decrease in the number of shares by agent C ( N C ,t  0 ). Note that for a
given price increase, the horizontal gap between both functions is the Bid-Ask spread. Finally note
that the "supply" and "demand" tags were attached to these functions in order to correspond to
their common representation in economics, yet their names should really been reversed. The
values we used to draw these functions are:
ˆ  0.6,  M  166.7,  M  0.4, C  20.8,  C  1.2, N M  N C  10, DM  50, DC  25

C. Equilibrium
Though taste parameters remain fixed, aggregate marginal supply/demand change
periodically due to changes in wealth allocation among agent groups. Individuals submit
matching vectors of quantities and share prices, being their marginal supply/demand
function, to a clearing agency assumed to operate in a tâtonnement procedure. The
tâtonnement aggregates individual supply and demand functions and by clearing excess
marginal demand set a new equilibrium price each period.9 We show that the resulting
price path satisfies Pareto-optimality, yet rational-expectations equilibrium hold if the

8

These marginal supply and demand functions for shares also provide a basis for trade under a certain
group of REE equilibria, among them the Merton (1971) model, yet, this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper.
9 Note that since the marginal functions are convex and defined on the same plane for all agents,
aggregation is allowed across individual tastes.
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PLM equal the ALM, being equivalent to Merton's (1971) price process. The Walrasian
equilibrium conditions are,
 Pt d t  Pt s t


.

N



N
C
,
t


t
M
,
t


t


By using N C ,t  N M ,t  N , t in (9) and (11) and using the wealth-conserving
budget constraint (1), we solve for the equilibrium price of shares Pt* t ,
~*
~*
~*
~*

ˆ  S M ,t  t SC ,t  t DM ,t  t DC ,t  t

Pt  t  



  M  C 
N  M
C
M
C

.
~
~
*
*

ˆ  WM ,t  t WC ,t  t
 

  M  C 
N  M
C

Asterisks represent Pareto-optimal equilibrium values. Equation (14) translates to
the continuous time equivalent when t  0 ,
*

W*
ˆ  W
Pt   M ,t  C ,t   M  C  .
N  M
C

This equilibrium price is consistent with previous results, being a weightedaverage value of wealth managed by each group, weighted by the divergence of agents'
measure of risk aversion  K from ̂ . Here however the displacement effect of  M  C
plays an important role as it distinguishes strategies by marginal trade 10. Comparing to
popular utility functions, if  M  C  0 then, by Table 1, (15) reduces to the CRRA
case. It turns out that this solution for the HARA-type utility function is a generalization
of Ross's (1975) and Friend and Blume's (1975) results for multiple agents based on
CRRA utility functions. Further, if we assume that all agents have identical risk
parameters, (    M   C ;   M  C ), (15) reduces to Merton's (1971) optimal
investment rule with a single agent (ibid. equation [49]). The above-mentioned authors
derived their results under the assumptions of exogenous, visible price process with price
taking investors. (15) is similar in form to these results but different in meaning. On one
hand it shows that the equilibrium share price process satisfy a Pareto-optimum asset
allocation each period, regardless of the existence of REE. On the other hand, price path
(15) is determined by the risk-aversion-weighted wealth of all agents M and C who hold
the asset.
III. Temporary deviations from REE - Bubbles
We argue that if the assumption that all agents know all other's tastes and wealth
is relaxed, than the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) will most likely be different than the
PLM. It appears reasonable to assume that during IPO pre-sale and after trade begins for
the share, agents are unable to deduce other's strategies from market prices thus non-REE
10

The equilibrium price in (14) exists and is unique since the utility functions from which the supply and
demand functions were derived are monotone, and strictly concave over the entire domain. Existence and
uniqueness can be proved by one of the fixed-point theorems for smooth, continuous functions, e.g.,
Debreu (in Theory of Value, 1959) or Kakutani (in McKenzie L., On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of
World Trade, Econometrica, Vol. 22, pp. 147-161, 1954)

(13)

(14)

(15)
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pricing might prevail. The divergence of the ALM from PLM will last longer if the share
is of a new-technology since idiosyncratic risk makes dynamic learning a longer and
more complex process. Such divergence will take the shape of a "boom" and "crash"
pattern if the return and variability are serially correlated at each phase separately. In the
following sub-sections we show that this will be the case for the "boom" phase, while the
"crash" is discussed in the next section.
A. Average Growth Rates
In order to evaluate the realized average return as a function of the expected
return when agent heterogeneity is unobservable, take the expected value of (14) and find
its time differential,
D  
D
E ( Ptt ) ˆ   S M ,t SC ,t 
 ˆ   M ,t  C ,t r  .
  

t
N   M
C 
 C  
 M
Since DK ,t corresponds to the optimal amount held in shares at each period, we



replace it with DK ,t  S K ,t  K  1   K  K , which is a reorganization of (8), being the
ˆ
 

agent's investment strategy, but now denoted in terms of the amount held in bonds.
Replace the bond strategy into (16), multiply by t and divide through by Pt to obtain the
actual return process
S
S S
 
E ( Ptt ) ˆ   S M ,t SC ,t 
 ˆt   t  M ,t  C ,t   M  C rt  .
tt 
  


Pt
St    M
C 
C
 ˆ  M
 
Rearrange terms to represent the above in proportional values and obtain

   C  
 rt ,
tt  t ( ˆ  r )t  1  ˆ M

S
t



 ˆ

ˆ
where t  
 M ,t 
 C ,t  is a weighted-average factor of asset holdings
C
M

S
and  K ,t  K ,t ,  C ,t  1   M ,t . It turns out that  t* t is a linear function of the riskSt
premium over each time interval t. In order to satisfy REE, t* t  ˆ must hold, for
which condition t  1 and  M  C  0 are necessary and sufficient conditions as can
be deduced from (17). Assuming zero displacements, if t  1 holds, the realized return
will be an amplification of ̂ and if t  1 it will be dimmed, i.e., a negative mispricing.
B. Volatility
The variance of the actual share price process, (14) is
2
 ˆ  S M ,t SC ,t   2

  ˆ ,
Var ( Pt  t )   


N


M
C




(16)

(17)
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or, by replacing  K ,t 

N K ,t
, the instantaneous standard deviation of price change
N

is

 ˆ

ˆ
 t* t  Var ( Pt*t )  
 M ,t 
 C ,t ˆ  tˆ .
C
M

That is, the actual price change variability is a zero-constant linear function of the
expected variability, with t serving as the coefficient. If t  1 the ex-post price path
will be identical to the ex-ante, satisfying REE; if t  1 the realization will be an
amplification of the perceived variability and if t  1 the realized variability will be a
dimmed multiple of ˆ .
It is important to note that for both moments, ̂ and ˆ , a crowding-out effect
intensifies the divergence of the realized moments from the perceived ones. This
crowding-out has no limit under MDE but it is limited for the CDE equilibrium as
presented in sub-section C below. The reason for the crowding-out under MDE is that
agents M buy shares from agents C when t  1 .11 By doing so, t further increases
above its previous level and the crowding-out (stochastically) intensifies in time. The
higher the share price grows above the PLM price, agents M demand more shares but
agents C have less to offer, thus the periodic equilibrium price closes at higher and higher
levels, for declining trade volumes.
C. Dynamic Stability
This sub-section presents the technical properties of the dynamic evolution of the
boom phase only, while reversion to REE is discussed in the next section. In general,
dynamic stability properties of (the expected value of) a process like (14) are analyzed by
adding its homogenous and particular solutions for a given seed, as it is a first order
linear difference equation of the type Pt  Pt 1 A  B . Specifying the initial condition P0
(the IPO price) determines the solution sequence P0 , P1 , P2 , P3 ,... , where each term is
found by Pt 1  Pt A  B t  1,2,3... . By a Theorem of linear first order difference
equations, the solution for the sequence can be expressed in terms of P0 , A and B in the
following way,
1  At
t
Pt  A P0  B
for A  1 t  0,1,2 ,3,...
,
1 A
Pt  P0  Bt
for A  1 t  0,1,2,3,...
B
where, if  1  A  1 the solution sequence converges to P 
, otherwise it
1 A
diverges, unless Pt  P0 . Rearranging (14) to conform with the above layout yields

E ( Pt )  P0 0 

*
*

ˆ   DM ,0 DC ,0 
,





M
C

N    M
 C 


There is a secondary crowding-out effect that persists even when t  1 , yet with reasonable risk
aversion parameters and equal initial wealth allocation it requires 10-20 years for that effect to mature. As
noted above, our horizon for post-IPO bubbles is much shorter.
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(18)

22

thus


ˆ
ˆ 
A  0    M ,0
  C ,0
,
M
 C 

.
*
*

ˆ  DM ,0 DC ,0
B

  M  C 

N   M
C

This model thus maintains three equilibria sets, depending on the IPO allocation
between agents C and M: REE equilibria (no bubbles), Momentum Dominance Equilibria
(MDE, positive bubbles) and Contrarian Dominance Equilibria (CDE, negative
mispricing).
1) If conditions 0  1 , and  M  C  0 hold at IPO date, the expected ALM
grows at the expected value of the PLM, resulting in REE. The REE price path can be
constructed at a continuum of agents' wealth and taste combinations, all maintain
ALM=PLM, but each with a different trade level. The analysis of trade is not discussed in
this paper.
2) Momentum Dominance Equilibria will evolve if inequality 0  1 holds (for
  t* t  ˆ 
 . Should
 M  C  0 ) at IPO date, generating positive bubbles whereby  *

ˆ



t


t


 M  C  0 , average return will change with the inequality sign. There is no upper limit
to the potential divergence of the ALM from the PLM.
3) Contrarian Dominance Equilibria will emerge if 0  1 holds at the IPO,
  t* t  ˆ 
 if  M  C  0 . As in the previous case,
generating negative mispricing with  *


ˆ


 t  t

if  M  C  0 , the average return will increase/decline with the inequality sign, being a
displacement to the price kernel. Unlike the MDE case however, here the ALM will
converge in finite time to a steady state level given by the t=0 PLM
*
*

ˆ  WM ,0 WC ,0
E ( Pt ) 

  M  C  .

N   M
C


IV. Analysis of Equilibria and Crashes
A. The Benchmark - REE Equilibria
As a benchmark for discussing bubbles, it appears advantageous to analyze the
conditions underlying REE equilibria. In order to satisfy REE, ex-ante estimates must
hold also ex-post, i.e., both conditions
0  1 



 ˆ   M  C 

  0 
   S
0

 


(19)
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 ˆ

ˆ
at (17) and (18) must hold. The first condition, 0  
 M ,0 
 C ,0   1 can
C
M

be solved for  M since  C  1   M . In this case the proportion of shares agents M hold
out of total shares outstanding is a constant satisfying
1 ˆ  1  C
,
 MREE 
1  M 1 C

which guaranties



*
t  t

 ˆ  . The second condition requires zero-sum

displacement factors and, in combination with the first condition, assures t*t  ˆ .
Assuming conditions (19) hold, equation (20) shows that there is a continuum of riskaversion combinations that satisfy REE. This functional relationship between risk
aversions and the market price for risk is graphically presented in Figure 2. One can
observe that the REE line serves as a border-line that distinguishes between the MDE and
CDE equilibria types.
Figure 2
Rational Expectations Equilibrium For
Varying Levels of Risk Aversion and a Given 

For a given  MREE there is a continuum of attainable REE equilibria that will prevail for
given risk aversions and market price for risk, ̂ (here ̂ =1). Any combination between risk
aversions and a given ̂ that lies in the area above the  MREE (i.e., 0  1 ) line is a (temporary)
Momentum Dominance Equilibrium (MDE), while below this line the (temporary) Contrarian
Dominance Equilibrium (CDE) will prevail.

 ˆ

ˆ
From 0  
 M ,0 
 C ,0  one can see that if agents who buy shares at IPO
C
M

are more risk-averse 0 will decline and if less risk-averse agents participate, the value
of 0 increases.

(20)

24

B. Bubbles - Discussion and Illustration
By definition, bubbles are temporary phenomena throughout which prices diverge
from REE. In this model it is sufficient to assume incomplete information about agent's
tastes and wealth in order to obtain bubbles. It appears that IPO of new-technologies are
best candidates to exhibit bubbles since buyers do not observe each other's tastes and
wealth at IPO date. After the IPO agents can collect market data, deduce the moments
that characterize the stochastic process and revise their strategy based on that
information. With new-technology shares however the market data is noisy and might
require a long sample, i.e., investment in new-technology assets imply the undertaking of
uninsurable risk at least for some period post-IPO. IPOs of companies with existing
technologies should not exhibit bubbles since agents can hedge the IPO share by holding
assets who's covariability with the IPO asset is non-zero. As long as contingent claims for
the new technology do not exist, the only way agents can insure the wealth they hold at
the new-technology is by applying dynamic asset allocation strategies. The above
Momentum and Contrarian strategies are such optimal strategies as they imply replication
of option.
Figure 3a illustrates the average growth rates of the three generic possibilities
(REE, MDE and CDE) and Figure 3b presents an REE stochastic sample path, together
with an amplification of it under MDE and a dimming version of the same under CDE.

Figure 3a
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Share Price
800
700

Momentum Dominance

600

REE
500
400

Contrarian Dominance

300

Time
241

229

217

205

193

181

169

157

145

133

121

97

109

85

73

61

49

37

25

1

13

200

25

Figure 3b
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Figure 3a presents expected and Figure 3b sample-paths of the three possible share price equilibria
under marginal trade aggregation. In Figure 3b the three paths use the same vector of dzt, thus differences
result from agent heterogeneity. If agents who apply a Momentum strategy dominate (MDE) the
equilibrium path will be an amplification of the PLM. If Contrarian agents dominate, the realized path will
be a deemed version of the PLM.

C. Reversion of Bubbles to REE - Not Necessarily a "Crash"
The reason for a "crash" or, more generally, reversion of the ALM to REE is
intentionally not prescribed in this model in a formal manner. We focused on the
reasoning of a divergence of ALM from PLM, which implies divergence from the strict
formal definition of REE. Under this definition, RE assumes agents hold a complete
knowledge about the economy - its structure (institutions, other agents, markets and
changes in those) and value of parameters in the economy. Alternatively, agents must at
least agree on a model of the economy and its parameters. For a stochastic model,
agreement on the distribution of shocks is also required. Empirical economists who test
for rationality use past data in order to estimate parameters of a model, or the economy's
future state, implying that the experts themselves lack complete knowledge. It thus
appear reasonable to assume that agents conduct procedures as if they were
econometricians, which means some form of "bounded rationality", as suggested by
Sargent (1993).
If diversion of the ALM from PLM is due to incomplete information, as described
in the model detailed above, the question is what forces govern a reversion to REE?
There are two types of "add-on" models that can be supplemented to our model. The first
one stems from the classic view of RE theory. It postulates reversion to REE through
agent screening, a process under which agents who fail to accurately predict the PLM
loose their wealth to agents who make accurate predictions and thus are driven out of the
market in finite time. Since the accurate prediction is the RE solution, the RE pricing will
prevail (see Sandroni, 2000 for a comprehensive discussion and proofs). Note that this
view implies that an economy with non price-taking agents end-up with temporary
deviation from REE, though not necessarily in a boom and crash pattern. If our "boom"
reverts to REE based on that notion, the reversion need not be sudden ("crash").
Second type of models comprises the dynamic learning approach. In general,
these consider economic agents as econometricians who apply statistical tools on past
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data and use the results to establish optimal future decisions. In that sense, this approach
set a solid ground for empirical estimation of the above model. In most cases, dynamic
learning models use Recursive Least Squares, whereby agents are assumed to run
regressions on historic data and estimate the model parameters, testable ex-post by
ARMA type processes.12 If the reversion to REE of post-IPO mispricing is based on that
approach, than by the homogeneous information assumption all agents of a given type
should apply the same rule once data become available. Since data is available to all
simultaneously, a prompt adjustment, i.e., a crash, is unavoidable.
V. Summary
The model proposed above presents a simple technique to calculate asset prices,
drawing elements from Merton (1971) and standard microeconomic supply/demand
equilibrium. Its major advantages are its ability to specify a wide spectrum of dynamic
equilibria; defining a many-to-one correspondence between measures or risk aversion and
investment strategies and allowing empirical tests for temporary mispricing. It turns out
that in-spite of homogenous information and rationality, there are infinite combinations
of tastes (risk aversion) that result in the single REE path. In addition, we define two sets
of temporary equilibria other than the REE. One is a set of Momentum Dominance
Equilibria (MDE) in which variability and drift of a PLM are linearly amplified. The
second is a set of Contrarian Dominance Equilibria (CDE) where the ALM exhibits linear
dimmed variability and drift vs. the PLM.
We achieve this variety of equilibria since we add a new degree of freedom to
asset pricing, being marginal supply and demand functions for shares. We derive the
marginal functions from investment strategies that are based on the agent's utility
function. The marginal supply/demand functions look like regular microeconomic ones,
and in particular they are twice differentiable and strictly convex over the entire domain.
These functions may as well serve in the empirical study of price formation being
normative bid and ask aggregate functions.
The model is essentially a model of bubbles, while the reversion to REE may be
gradual, if some agents who accurately predict the PLM drive the others out of the
market. Or, it can end in a "crash" when information from post-IPO market prices makes
it clear to all shareholders that the ALM has been constructed based on moments higher
than those at the PLM.

12

Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 provide a comprehensive survey and detailed expositions of the subject
from different perspectives.
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Appendix 1
Table 1
Risk Aversion Properties of a HARA Type Utility Function
Function/
Measure of Risk Aversion

A(W ) =

A (W ) 

R (W ) 

Values Obtained for Specific
Conditions

Implies > W (1-  ) if  > 1

1
0
W

1- 

1
 W

(1   )
  
1



 W

  

1


2

2

Investor Risk
Attitude
Risk Averse

Absolute Risk Aversion
 0 for -  <  < 1
= 0 for  = +

DARA
CARA

Relative Risk Aversion
 0 for  < 0, -  <  < 1
= 0 for   0

DRRA
CRRA

Source: Merton (1971).
Table 1 shows that the HARA type utility function can produce absolute or relative measure of risk
aversion, either can be decreasing, increasing or constant. We ignore increasing constant and relative risk
aversions.
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Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1:
A marginal demand function for shares must maintain a negative slope for (10),
ˆ ~
D
 C  C
d
Pt  t
 C C ,t  t

 0.
2
 ( N C ,t  t )
ˆ 




 N C ,t 1 


    N C ,t  t 

C




Since the market price for risk ̂ is ex-ante positive and  C must be strictly positive to
assure risk aversion, than the numerator must be positive, which implies
~
C   DC ,t t /  C . By restricting C , we implicitly limit  C as well. Solving the asset



allocation problem (8), for

̂
C

and replacing



~
WˆC ,t t  SˆC ,t t  DC ,t t

(A1)

and

 C ,t tWˆC ,t t  SˆC ,t t , we get
SˆC ,t  t
ˆ

 1.
~
 C SˆC ,t t  D



C ,t  t
C C
~
Thus, DC ,t t  C C  0 imply  C  ˆ . Convexity of the marginal demand function
for shares will be satisfied if the second derivative is positive,
ˆ ~
2
D
 C  C
Pt d t
 C C ,t  t

 0.
3
 ( dN C2 ,t  t ) 
ˆ



 N C ,t 1     N C ,t  t 
  


C 



Given the restrictions in (A1) and (A2), (A3) will be satisfied iff the denominator is
N C ,t
 C .
positive, thus 0  ˆ
N C ,t  t
Q.E.D.



(A2)



(A3)

32

Appendix 3
Proof of Proposition 2:
Pt s
Upward slope of the payoff schedule requires (12) to satisfy
 0 , i.e.,
( N M ,t )
ˆ ~
D
 M  M
Pt s t
 M M ,t  t

 0,
2
 ( N M ,t  t )
ˆ




 N M ,t 1     N M ,t  t 




 M 


~
which implies  M   DM ,t t /  M . Assuming agents M are in aggregate net lenders,





(A4)

than  M must be strictly negative. In order to define the conditions on  M , solve (8) for

̂
M

S M ,t t
ˆ

 1.
 M S M ,t t  DM ,t t   M  M
~
Based on  M   DM ,t t /  M , (A5) imply  M  ˆ . In order to assess convexity, the
derivative of (A4) must be positive,
ˆ ~
2
D
 M  M
Pt s t
 M M ,t  t

 0,
3
 ( N M2 ,t ) 
ˆ



 N M ,t 1     N M ,t  t 




 M 


which implies the denominator must be negative, thus the stricter inequality
N
 M  ̂ M ,t must hold. Note that (A6) cannot be zero since the numerator is strictly
N M ,t  t



(A5)



negative. In addition, by the assumption of risk aversion,  M must be positive, thus
N M ,t
0   M  ˆ
.
N M ,t  t
Q.E.D.

(A6)

